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THE PROHIBITION OF UNION RESTRICTIONS ON
MEMBERS' RESIGNATIONS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT'S
POLICY OF VOLUNTARY UNIONISM:
PATTERN MAKERS' LEAGUE OF NORTH
AMERICA v. NLRB
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act)' provides that union
membership, as a condition of employment, may require no more than
the payment of union dues.2 The policy of "voluntary unionism" im-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1982).
2. Section 7 contains what are commonly referred to under the Act as the "employ-
ees' rights." This section provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations .... and to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Under § 8(a)(3), the only aspect of union membership that can be required pursuant
to a union security agreement is the payment of dues. Section 8(a)(3) provides in perti-
nent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization: ... Provided further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization... (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Section 8(a)(3) whittles "membership," as a condition of employment, down to its
financial core. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). See also
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). Employees under a union security
agreement, therefore, are required to pay union dues but do not have to assume full
union membership. At the same time, an employee who chooses to reduce his or her
affiliation to that of being a "dues paying member only" forfeits the right to participate
in or vote on union business. See General Drivers, Dairy Employees & Helpers Local
Union No. 579 (Northern Conveyor Mfg. Corp.), 274 N.L.R.B. 22 (1985); Carpenters
Dist. Council for Seattle, King County and Vicinity (Tulles Garden Constr. Inc.), 277
N.L.R.B. 19 (1985). See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Those who do not
assume full membership are not subject to union discipline. Pattern Makers' League of
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plicit in section 8(a)(3) protects an employee's decision to assume or
decline the obligations of full union membership. The United States
Supreme Court recently recognized and enforced this policy when it
found an inconsistency between voluntary unionism and union restric-
tions on a member's right to resign.' In Pattern Makers' League of
North America v. NLRB 5 the Court held that the Act prohibits unions
from fining employees who have tendered resignations that are not rec-
ognized under a restriction in the union's constitution.6
Pattern Makers' League of North America's7 League Law 13 pro-
hibited employees from resigning during a strike or when a strike is
imminent.' The League fined ten members who, in violation of this
provision, resigned during a strike and returned to work.' The em-
ployers' collective-bargaining agent subsequently filed unfair labor
North America v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064, 3071 (1985). These employees are "'mem-
bers' of the union only in the most limited sense," 105 S. Ct. 3064, 3071, n.16, and, in
fact, are often referred to as "financial core" members, a term first coined in the Court's
interpretation of § 8(a)(3) in General Motors. See United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local No. 115, 277 N.L.R.B. 83 (1985); United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local No. 1439, 275 N.L.R.B. 140 (1985).
In section 8(a)(3), Congress solved union concern about "free-riders" by allowing
unions to exact dues from nonmembers. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,
40-42 (1954). "Free-riders" are those employees who enjoy the benefits of union repre-
sentation, but are unwilling to contribute their share of financial support to the union.
Id. See also Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1050
(1976).
3. Section 8(a)(3) bans compulsory union membership by prohibiting closed shop
agreements. Closed shop agreements require employers to hire and retain only full
union members in good standing. Section 8(a)(3) "protects the employment rights of
the dissatisfied member, as well as those of the worker who never assumed full member-
ship." Pattern Makers'League, 105 S. Ct. at 3071. Implicit in this provision, therefore,
is the policy of voluntary unionism, mandating that employees be free to resign from the
union at any time. Id.
4. Id.
5. 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
6. 105 S. Ct. at 3068.
7. Pattern Makers' League of North America is a national labor union composed of
local associations [hereinafter the League].
8. The provision [hereinafter League Law 13] was an amendment to the union's
constitution and provided that: "No resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or
from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike
or lockout appears imminent." Id. at 3066.
9. Upon expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement, two locals commenced a
strike against several manufacturing companies who were part of a multi-employer bar-
gaining unit. Forty-three members of the two local unions participated. Four months
after the locals formally rejected a contract offer, the first of the ten members resigned
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practice"° charges with the National Labor Relations Board, which is-
sued a complaint against the union for restricting the members' resig-
nations." The Administrative Law Judge held that League Law 13
impeded the employees' statutory right to resign union membership
from the union and returned to work. During the next three months, the remaining
nine members resigned. Id.
The fine levied against each of the ten employees was the approximate equivalent of
his earnings during the strike. The union informed the members that their resignations
had been rejected and fines were subsequently levied as sanctions for returning to work.
Id.
10. The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association represented the employers
during the collective bargaining process. It filed charges with the NLRB claiming that
levying fines against the employees who had returned to work was an unfair labor prac-
tice in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 3066-67.
Congress defined unfair labor practices in § 158 of the Act. Subsections (a), (b), (c),
(e) and (f) of this section enumerate those forms of conduct that constitute unfair labor
practices. Subsections (a) and (b) specify acts that, if engaged in by employers and labor
organizations, respectively, would be unfair labor practices. It is not an unfair labor
practice under subsection (c) for either party to express or disseminate their views, pro-
vided such expression does not contain threats of reprisal or promise of economic bene-
fit. Subsection (e) prohibits secondary boycotts, making it an unfair labor practice for
unions and employers to enter into agreements whereby the employer agrees not to deal
with or to cease doing business with another employer. Finally, subsection (f) provides
exceptions for situations in which a construction industry employer may enter into
agreements with labor organizations, whose members are engaged in that industry, that
would otherwise constitute an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) or (b).
11. Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1935 to inves-
tigate and remedy charges of unfair labor practices brought under Title 29. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 153-160 (1982). Once a charge is filed, an investigation is conducted from
which a regional director of the NLRB decides whether to issue a complaint against the
charged party. Id. § 160(b). The regional director will issue an unfair labor practice
complaint if the dispute does not warrant dismissal and cannot otherwise be resolved.
If an unfair labor practice complaint is issued, the matter is set for hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose order the NLRB may endorse, modify, or
vacate with or without further testimony or argument. Id. § 160(b), (c). The NLRB is
required to dismiss the complaint unless its General Counsel proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that an unfair labor practice has been committed. Id. § 160(c). If an
unfair labor practice is established, the NLRB is further required to issue a "cease and
desist" order and is empowered to take such remedial action as will correct the effects of
the unfair labor practice. Id. Reinstatement of employees to their jobs and awards of
backpay are among the remedial measures available to the NLRB under the Act. Id.
See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). See generally R.
GORMAN, BASiC TEsr ON LABOR LAW 7-10 (1976).
NLRB orders in unfair labor practice cases are not self-executing, but, rather, the
NLRB must petition a United States court of appeals to obtain enforcement of its order.
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). The NLRB's findings of fact will stand "if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.... ." Id. See also Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). When courts reverse a NLRB order, the
issues tend to be denominated as questions of law, which prevents deference to the
1987]
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and that the fines imposed violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 2
The NLRB agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's findings.'"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the
NLRB's order.4
The overall purpose of the Act is to stabilize industrial relations
through collective bargaining contracts negotiated between labor and
management.15 A major premise underlying the collective bargaining
concept is that through a democratically selected organization, em-
ployees can act collectively to achieve the most effective means of bar-
gaining for their contract terms.' 6 Congress provided for employee
NLRB's findings. See, eg., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
12. Id. at 3067. The Administrative Law Judge issued an order for the union to
cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practice. Id.
13. Id.
14. 724 F.2d 57, 60 (7th Cir. 1983). The court stated: [B]ecause League Law 13
completely suspends an employee's right to choose not to be a union member and thus
no longer subject to union discipline, it frustrates the overriding policy of labor law that
employees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities. Id.
In NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213 (1972), the Court held that upon
"lawful dissolution of the union-member relation, the union has no more control over
the former member than it has over the man in the street." Id. at 217. The Court's
meaning of "lawful dissolution" was not fully explained, except to the extent that a
union member with no outstanding debts owed to the union may lawfully resign and
terminate the parties' association. Id. at 215-16. See also NLRB v. District Lodge No.
99, 489 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1974).
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Subchapter II, Section 151 of the
National Labor Relations Act sets forth Congress' Findings and Declarations of Policy.
The pertinent language provides as follows:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full free-
dom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms of their employment.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
The Act's intended beneficiaries are employees, not labor unions. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968) (prohibition of unfair
labor practices designed to prevent employees' free exercise in their decision to become
union members was intended as a grant of rights to employees rather than a grant of
power to unions); NLRB v. Local 338, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 531 F.2d 1162 (2nd Cir.
1976) (subchapter II designed to permit workers to exercise their rights to join unions,
to be active or passive members, or to abstain from joining any union at all without
imperiling their right to a livelihood). See also Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under
Section 8(b)(1)(4) of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 20 LOYOLA L. REv. 245 (1974).
16. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). The effect of the
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rights in section 7 of the Act 17 in order to effectuate employees' pursuit
of meaningful collective activity.18 Section 7 grants employees the
right to either engage in or refrain from all concerted activities con-
cerning self-organization and collective bargaining.19
Section 8(b)(1)(A) enforces section 7, making it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights.2z Congress enacted section 8(b)(1)(A) to ensure em-
ployees' freedom from restraint or coercion in deciding whether to join
the union.21 A proviso to that section, however, allows unions to pre-
scribe their own rules regarding membership acquisition and reten-
tion." An intrinsic tension thus lies between an employee's section 7
policy is to "extinguish the employee's power to order his own relations with his em-
ployer and create a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interest of all
employees." Id. See also Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212, 1216 (9th
Cir. 1984) (federal labor policy restricts the employee's absolute power to order his
relations with management, but rather vests his power in a collective representative who
must protect the interests of everyone in the bargaining unit), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3517
(1985).
17. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 1940). See
also NLRB v. Thompson Products, Inc., 130 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1942).
19. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. at 3068. The
"right to refrain" is not absolute. The Act authorizes union-imposed fines against full
members. See e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (Court
upheld union fines of members crossing picket lines).
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
21. Senator Smith, a co-sponsor of this provision, indicated that its purpose is to
"protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not they desire to join labor
organizations, to prevent them from being restrained or coerced." 93 CONG. REc. 4435
(1947). Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 188.
22. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(b) it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
Legislative history indicates that Congress, in its adoption of this section, did not
intend to regulate unions' internal affairs. See 93 CONG. REC. 4272 (1947). The
Supreme Court interprets the proviso to preserve, at minimum, the union's rights "to
impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the
explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for non-payment [of dues]." Allis-Chalmers, 388
U.S. at 191-92. Conversely, the words "acquisition or retention" of membership are not
to be defined so broadly as to vest power in the union to discipline a member who seeks
the Act's protection for a matter that is in the public domain and beyond the internal
affairs of the union. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391
1987]
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right to participate or refrain from participating in concerted activity
and the union's rights under the proviso to determine its own condi-
tions of membership.23
The first in a line of decisions addressing these conflicting rights was
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company.24 In Allis-Chalmers
a divided Court held that a fine was a proper form of union disci-
pline.25 The Court recognized a prevailing contract theory underlying
the union-member relationship, under which union provisions defining
punishable conduct and procedures for adjudicating such matters con-
stitute part of the union-member contract.26
U.S. 418, 426 (1968). See also Carpenters Dist. Council of Southern Colorado v.
NLRB, 560 F.2d 1015, 1020 (10th Cir. 1977) (proviso exempts strictly intra-union dis-
ciplinary proceedings from charges of unfair labor practices, but it does not confer carte
blanche upon unions with respect to internal proceedings whenever considerations of
overriding national labor policy are involved).
When adopting § 8(b)(1), Congress expressly disclaimed any intent to interfere with
the unions' internal affairs. The express language of that section reinforces Congress'
disclaimer by stating that labor organizations shall have the right to prescribe their own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership. Allis-Chalmers, 388
U.S. at 192-93.
A Senate Report formally expressed the intent shared generally by members of Con-
gress that the Act was not designed to interfere with the internal affairs of the union. S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1947). See also 93 CONG. REc. 4318 (1947)
(statement of Sen. Taft) ("The pending measure does not propose any limitation with
respect to the internal affairs of unions.").
23. The Ninth Circuit feels that this "conflict is falsely created because both the
employee's rights and the union's interests must-and do--coexist." See International
Ass'n of Machinists Local 1327, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf denied, 725 F.2d 1212,
1217 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985). See supra notes 2, 22 and accom-
panying texts.
24. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
25. Several union members refused to participate in a strike and returned to work.
After the strike, the members were tried by the union on charges of violating the union
constitution and bylaws. Each was found guilty and fined. Upon the members' refusal
to pay, the union won enforcement of the fines in state court. Id. at 177.
26. Id. at 192. The contract theory rationale states that by joining the union, an
employee enters into a contract, which terms are expressed in the union constitution
and bylaws. Summers, LegalLimitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049,
1054 (1951). The recognized advantage of this theory is that it provides express stan-
dards for judicial review and thus permits the courts to avoid ruling on the merits of
each dispute. Id. The general view among commentators, however, is that the member-
ship contract concept is nothing but a legal fabrication producing an adhesion contract
binding the member but not the union. This is the result of the vague and changeable
identities of the terms and parties to the agreement. Id. at 1055. In support of the
theory, one commentator asserts that "[ihe general contractual freedom accorded to
labor unions extends to workers' Section 7 rights." Note, A Union Is Right to Control
Strike-Period Resignations, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 363 (1984). Under this view, an
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The Court believed that its only role was contract enforcement.27
The Court observed that federal labor policy, coupled with the union-
member contract, vests unions with the authority to order employee
and employer relations.2" Integral to this policy is the chosen union's
power to protect its interest in presenting a unified front.29 That
power, indispensable during a strike, would be undermined if reason-
able discipline for violating rules of membership were literally inter-
preted as restraint or coercion in the exercise of section 7 rights.30
In interpreting section 8(b)(1)(A), the Court drew a distinction be-
tween internal and external enforcement of union rules.3 1 The Court
considered "internal" those actions taken against full union members32
pursuant to a nonarbitrary rule aimed at achieving a legitimate union
interest.33 By contrast, it found "external" those union actions either
interfering with an employee's employment status or taken against
employee may waive his § 7 right to refrain from union activity through the union-
member agreement. Id. at 363-64. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
27. 388 U.S. at 182. This is the Court's general view in cases in which the issue of
restrictions on resignations is not involved. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75-
76 (1973).
28. 388 U.S. at 181.
29. Id. The Court acknowledged that the union's interest in, and need for, solidarity
is greatest when members elect to strike. An economic strike against the employer is
considered to be the union's "ultimate weapon... for achieving agreement upon its
terms." Id. Federal labor policy, therefore, considers it vital that unions be afforded
the protected right to fine or expel strikebreakers in order to be an effective bargaining
agent. Id.
30. Id. at 184.
31. Id. at 195. The Court concluded that the proscriptions contained in
§ 8(b)(l)(A) did not reach a union's internal actions. Id. at 191.
32. For description of "full member," see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. 388 U.S. at 194-95. Accord Machinists Local Lodge 1414 (Neufield Porsche-
Audi, Inc.), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1333 (1984). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(A) shows that Congress implicitly intended to dis-
tinguish between members and nonmembers when judging the union's ability to restrict
the employee's right to work. See 93 CONG. Rc. 4435-36 (1947). With respect to this
amendment's intended effect, the record is clear that the union may not prevent non-
members from exercising their right to work. Id. Senator Taft acknowledged that the
implication for unions may be different when limiting a member's right to work. 93
CONG. REC. 4023 (1947). Senator Taft commented further, however, that from the
employee's point of view, it is clear that the two cases are parallel. Id.
In contrast, one commentator stated that "[i]t is ironic that in ruling that Congress
did not intend to interfere with internal union affairs by enacting § 8(b)(1)(A) the Court
actually invited courts to tinker with internal union affairs." Millan, supra note 15, at
253. The flip side of this contention, however, questions whether a union is proceeding
1987]
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nonmembers in violation of section 8(b)(1) provisions. 34
Public policy provided the Court with an alternative ground for
judging the validity of union rules in NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers.35 There, the Court determined
whether a union rule requiring grieving members to exhaust all inter-
nal union remedies before resorting to an outside tribunal was valid
under the Act.36 The Court found that the public interest in unim-
"internally" when it "hauls the accused from a union hearing into a court of law."
Wellington, supra note 2, at 1023.
The Court found further support for its conclusion in the legislative history of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 105 CONG. REc. 15,721
(1959). This Act deals with the internal affairs of unions, including the procedures for
imposing fines or expulsion. Recognizing that Congress' actions in 1959 do not estab-
lish congressional intent in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Court still considered the
1959 provisions relevant for what they reveal about Congress' reluctance toward regu-
lating union conduct. 388 U.S. at 194-95. See also NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffers, Help-
ers Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 291 (1960).
34. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 189-90 n.25. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying
text. See also Neufleld Porsche-Audi, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
Congress did not design § 8(b)(1)(A) to impair if the right of unions to regulate their
internal affairs, provided that enforcement of internal regulations does not affect a mem-
ber's employment status. 388 U.S. at 185. See 93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947). The Court
pointed to the difficulty in discerning Congress' intent due to the imprecise language of
"restrain or coerce" used in § 8(b)(1)(A). 388 U.S. at 184. The Court contrasted this
language with the explicit wording of § 8(b)(2), which provides that:
(b) It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982).
This section virtually removes a union's power to compel an employer to discharge a
terminated member other than for failure of the employee to pay union dues. 388 U.S.
at 184. To illustrate this contrast, the Court cited a Senate Report stating:
The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization with respect to either
its selection of membership or expulsion therefrom. But the committee did wish to
protect the employee in his job if unreasonably expelled or denied membership.
The tests provided by the amendment are based upon facts readily ascertainable
and do not require the employer to inquire into the internal affairs of the union.
S. Rr. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1947) (emphasis in original).
The Court concluded from its review of §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) that, because Con-
gress insulated an employee's membership from his job but left the union to regulate its
internal affairs through self-government, § 8(b)(1)(A) cannot be read "as contemplating
regulation of internal discipline." 388 U.S. at 185.
35. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
36. Id. After his grievance against the union president was dismissed, a union mem-
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peded access to the NLRB outweighed the union's interest in ordering
its own affairs and, therefore, invalidated the rule.37 The Court con-
cluded that section 8(b)(l)(A)'s proviso may not be read to extend be-
yond internal union matters and reach into the public domain. 8
The Court clarified and expanded the boundaries of a union's right
to internally enforce its rules against current members in Scofield v.
NLRB.39 In Scofield the Court upheld a union rule imposing produc-
tion ceilings and imposing fines on members exceeding those ceilings.'
The Court characterized section 8(b)(1)(A) as taking a "dual ap-
proach" to the union-member relationship.41 This approach permits a
union to internally enforce its rules by means such as expulsion or rea-
sonable fines, but prohibits external enforcement by means such as in-
ber took his complaint to the NLRB without pursuing any internal union appeal
procedures.
37. Id. at 424.
38. Id. The Court held that a union rule whose reach extends beyond legitimate
union affairs is invalid as a contravention of public policy. Id. at 425.
39. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
40. Id. The rule permitted members to produce as much as they liked each day, but
imposed a ceiling pay rate. The company "banked" the additional production. The
company retained production wages and paid out to the employee for days in which the
production ceiling was not reached. The company would comply with an employee's
demand to be paid in full over the ceiling rate, but the union assessed a fine of one dollar
for each violation. Failure to pay the fine could lead, as it did in this case, to expulsion.
Id. at 424-25.
41. That section, which outlaws the restraint or coercion of employees in the exer-
cise of their rights, allows a union, through reasonable means, to internally enforce its
rules. Section 8(b)(1)(a) explicitly prohibits a union from externally enforcing its rules.
394 U.S. at 428.
The purpose of this dual approach is to further the Act's policy of insulating employ-
ees' jobs from their organizational rights. Id. at 429 n.5. See also Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954) (the Act was designed to allow employees to freely
exercise their right of free association with the union-to join or resign-without imper-
iling their livelihood).
One aspect of the § 8(b)(1)(A) dual approach is that a union rule might be adminis-
tered internally but with an intended impact beyond the confines of the union organiza-
tion. The Court noted, however, that § 8(b)(1)(A) is not violated simply because
enforcement of the rule has an external effect. 394 U.S. at 432.
The Court summarized its holding in Scofield in a later opinion:
The underlying basis for the holding of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield was not that
reasonable fines were noncoercive under the language of Section 8(b)(1)(A) ....
but was instead that those provisions were not intended by Congress to apply to the
imposition by the union of fines, not affecting the employer-employee relationship
and not otherwise prohibited by the Act.
NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73 (1973).
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ducing an employer to exclude a member from the work force.42
The Court articulated a two part test to evaluate the lawfulness and
enforceability of union rules.43 First, the test allows a union to pursue
legitimate ends with properly adopted rules that do not contravene
congressional labor law policies.44 Second, the union must reasonably
enforce such rules against union members who are free to leave the
union and escape the rule.45 In Scofield, the union rule survived scru-
tiny under the dual approach because the union internally enforced it
to protect a legitimate interest against members who had a choice to
remain full members.46
42. 394 U.S. at 428.
43. Id. at 430. This test can technically be broken down into four parts, permitting
enforcement of a union rule when the rule: (1) is properly adopted; (2) reflects a legiti-
mate union interest; (3) impairs no policy Congress has embedded in the labor laws; and
(4) is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and
escape the rule. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The principles set forth in both Allis-Chalmers and Marine Workers are in-
corporated in the Scofield test. The test draws from Allis-Chalmers the principle that
the § 7 right to refrain from collective activity does not grant union members the free-
dom to disregard the union's rules with impunity. Unions must have freedom to apply
internal disciplinary measures directed at a valid interest. See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S.
at 194-96. The existence of a legitimate union interest, however, is nothing more than a
threshold issue in determining the lawfulness of a union rule. Dalmo Victor II, 263
N.L.R.B. 984, 992 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring).
The test also incorporates the message from Marine Workers that if the rule frustrates
an overriding policy of the labor laws, enforcement will be denied regardless of whether
the means would otherwise be considered internal and the end legitimate. 394 U.S. at
429. The Court essentially adopted the NLRB's view that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not neces-
sarily prohibit internal union rules that carry incidental external effects. The NLRB has
specifically stated:
We fully recognize that an internal union rule such as that in Scofield may well
have incidental external impact. The fundamental difference between such a rule
with incidental external effects and a rule restricting resignations, however, is that
the latter rule constitutes a unilateral reordering of the basic employee-union rela-
tionship that directly and fundamentally redraws the line between internal and ex-
ternal actions. Admittedly, this line is not always a clear one. It is clear to us,
however, that a union does not have the authority to determine unilaterally where
the line should be drawn.
Neutleld Porsche-Audi, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
46. 394 U.S. at 436. The Court said that § 8(b)(1)(A) is not necessarily violated
when a union rule has an impact beyond the confines of the union organization, pro-
vided that enforcement of the rule does not contravene a statutory labor policy. Id. at
432.
Scofield stands, in part, for the proposition that a union's power over the member is
no greater than the union-member contract. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S.
213, 217 (1972). The key to the Court's decision, therefore, was the member's freedom
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NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board47 tested the voluntary nature of
the union-member relationship. In Granite State a union sought to
enforce a rule that punished employees for returning to work during a
strike.48  The Court applied the Scofield test and concluded that a
member's lawful resignation dissolves the union-member relation-
ship.4 9 To support this conclusion, the Court also relied on the con-
tract principles of the union-member relationship established in both
Allis-Chalmers and Scofield.5 0 The Court concluded that when a re-
signed member later engages in conduct proscribed by a union rule,
union attempts to enforce fines against the resigned member for this
conduct constitute an unfair labor practice. 1
to leave the union and avoid the obligations of the union-member contract. 394 U.S. at
430. The Court asserted that where the union has imposed no restrictions on its mem-
bers' resignations, "the validity of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in
November from the actions he endorsed in May and that his § 7 rights are not lost by a
union's plea for solidarity." Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217-18. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
Given this power of choice, the member could not complain of restraint or coercion
within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A). 394 U.S. at 435-36. The Court pointed out that
those members who are prevented from obtaining all that their collective-bargaining
agreement has to offer have elected this condition in choosing to become and remain
union members. If a member is unable to effect a change in the rule, nothing precludes
him from leaving to earn what he can. Id. at 435.
47. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
48. Id. at 214. Shortly after the union commenced an economic strike against the
employer, the union held a meeting at which the membership resolved that any member
aiding or abetting the employer during the strike would be subject to a $2,000 fine. Id.
49. Id. at 216-17.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 217. The union argued that employees waived § 7 rights by voting for the
strike and authorizing strikebreaking fines. Id. The vote, the union urged, created a
mutual reliance among union members, with each sharing in the duties and risks of a
strike.
The rationale underlying the theory is that upon joining a union an employee enters
into a contract, the terms of which are expressed in the union's constitution and bylaws.
Summers, supra note 26, at 1054.
The Court dismissed this "waiver-estoppel" theory, ultimately placing the individ-
ual's rights above the union's institutional needs. 409 U.S. at 217-19. Unlike the lower
court, the Supreme Court gave little weight to the fact that the resigning employees had
participated in the vote to strike. Id. The waiver-estoppel theory, as applied in the
union-member context, also recognizes the voluntariness of the union-member relation-
ship. In doing so, however, it maintains that an individual cannot escape the obligations
he freely entered into. As expected, unions assert this standard argument when at-
tempting to enforce members' previous strike votes at some point in the future. Id. at
217. The NLRB does not consider the argument valid because the employee's right to
resign, as it is guaranteed under national labor policy, outweighs legitimate interests of
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Past NLRB rulings on unions' ability to restrict a member's right to
resign have also favored the individual employee's rights.5 2 According
to the NLRB, these restrictions are prohibited under section
8(b)(1)(A). 53 The NLRB reached this conclusion by balancing con-
the union. See, eg., Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 986 (1982), enf. denied, 725
F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984); Neufield Porsche-Audi, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
The Court agreed with the NLRB that voluntariness means that an individual is free
to leave the association when he or she can no longer accept its policies. The Court
rationalized its position as follows:
Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a
member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely duration of the strike
may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with which the em-
ployer replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less provident. We do not
now decide to what extent the contractual relationship between the union and
member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as here, there are no re-
straints on the resignation on members, we conclude that the vitality of Section 7
requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he en-
dorsed in May and that his Section 7 rights are not lost by a union's plea for
solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime.
409 U.S. at 217-18.
A subsequent application of Granite State occurred in Booster Lodge No. 405 v.
NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973). There, the Court reaffirmed the policy that absent any
contractual restrictions on members' resignations from the union, they are free to resign
at will. Id. In Booster Lodge a group of full union members had crossed the union's
picket line to return to work. All employees in the group had resigned from the union
either before or after returning to work. Id. at 85-86. The union imposed fines on all
strikebreaking employees regardless of whether, or when, they had resigned. Id at 86.
A unanimous Court held it an unfair labor practice for a union to seek court enforce-
ment of fines imposed for strikebreaking activities by employees who have resigned from
the union, even though the union constitution expressly prohibits members from strike-
breaking. Id. at 85. Union constitutions generally define strikebreaking as crossing a
picket line to accept employment in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists.
Id. at 86.
The union argued that, as a matter of contract law, the union's constitutional provi-
sion imposing an obligation on its members to refrain from strikebreaking is binding
because it was established while the employer was a member. Id. at 88-89. The Court
rejected the argument because members were not put on notice that the "misconduct of
a member" provision would be interpreted as imposing such an obligation on a resigned
member. Id. at 89. The Court stated that an implied post-resignation commitment
would no more be found in this fashion than it will be from an employee's participation
in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in Granite State. Id. at 89-90.
52. In the NLRB's view, § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits these restrictions. See, e.g., Dalmo
Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984); Neufleld
Porsche-Audi, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
53. Despite previous decisions in which the NLRB took the view that neither of
these two interests is absolute, the NLRB's decision in Pattern Makers'League indicates
that an employee's right to refrain, particularly the right to resign, is absolute. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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flicting principles of labor law. The NLRB has ultimately held that the
employee's freedom to pursue his individual interests is paramount to
the union's interest in being an effective representative for its
members.5
4
Two Circuit Courts reviewing NLRB invalidation of a union's con-
tractual restriction on a member's freedom to resign have taken con-
flicting approaches. Applying a contract law approach, the Ninth
Circuit" denied enforcement of the NLRB's order and upheld a union-
member agreement that conditioned the members' freedom to resign
on their promise not to break the strike.56 The court ruled that mem-
bers who broke the rule breached their membership contract with the
union. Imposing a fine on these members was a reasonable, if not the
only, means of union contract enforcement.57 In a similar case, the
Seventh Circuit58 adopted the NLRB's position, holding that the sec-
tion 7 right to refrain from union activities included the members' un-
qualified right to resign from the union.59
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits in Pattern Makers' League of North America v.
NLRB.6° In determining whether a union may restrict its members'
right to resign, the Court reasoned that NLRB decisions are entitled to
54. See Neufield Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. 1333-34. At least two members of the
NLRB refuted the notion that the NLRB's decisions have been the result of "balancing
competing rights" of the individual and the union. See Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B.
984, 991 (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring). Stating the equa-
tion as a balance, they asserted, implicitly equates the employee's express § 7 rights with
a union's institutional interest in strike solidarity. Id. at 990. Framed in this fashion,
the equation ignores the fact that what is involved is not a conflict between competing
"rights":
[T]he express Section 7 rights of employees are surely more than mere "interests"
subject to limitation because their operation somehow impinges upon the institu-
tional desires of a union. Conversely, a union's institutional interests ... have
never been elevated to the point where they stand on equal footing with, and, in-
deed, override and negate the fundamental protections of Section 7.
Id. at 991. A NLRB majority adopted the Dalno Victor 11 concurrence in Neufield
Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. 1330-34.
55. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.
1984).
56. 725 F.2d at 1218.
57. Id.
58. Pattern Maker's League of North America v. NLRB, 265 N.L.R.B. 1332
(1982), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 61.
60. 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
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deference because the Court had traditionally yielded to NLRB deci-
sions on whether union fines "restrained or coerced" employees and
because the NLRB had consistently construed section 8(b)(1)(A) to
prohibit the imposition of fines on employees whose resignations were
invalid under union constitution.61 The Court began by distinguishing
Allis-Chalmers and Granite State, reasoning that neither case involved
a provision like League Law 13, which restricted a member's right to
resign.62 In the Court's opinion, League Law 13 forbade union mem-
bers resignations, thereby frustrating the congressional policy of volun-
tary unionism implicit in section 8(a)(3).63 The Court reasoned that
because section 8(a)(3) eliminated compulsory full union membership
as a condition of employment, an employee's decision to resign and
give up his full union membership must also remain unimpeded.' The
Court then refuted the union's assertion that the voluntary unionism
policy was not contravened simply because the employees' employment
rights were not impaired.65
The remainder of the Court's opinion addressed the union's three
primary arguments. 66 First, the union maintained that League Law 13
was merely a rule aimed at the retention of membership within the
meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso.67 The Court, however, re-
jected the union's reading of the proviso.6" Rather, the Court asserted
61. Id. Such deference is appropriate in view of the "special competence" the
NLRB holds in the field of labor relations. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74-75
(1973) (a consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency
charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference by the courts). See also Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969).
62. 105 S. Ct. at 3068. The Court's earlier finding in Allis-Chalmers that Congress
disclaimed an intent to interfere with unions' internal affairs does not indicate that Con-
gress intended to authorize such restrictions. Id.
63. Id. at 3071. See supra notes 2, 51 and accompanying texts.
64. 105 S. Ct. at 3070.
65. Id. at 3071. The Court was not persuaded by the union's argument that because
the employee was not discharged, League Law 13 did not interfere with the employee's
employment rights. In the Court's opinion, a union has not left a "worker's employ-
ment rights inviolate when it exacts [his entire] paycheck in satisfaction of a flne im-
posed for working." Id. (quoting Wellington, supra note 2, at 1023).
66. 105 S. Ct. at 3071-76.
67. Id. at 3072.
68. Id. The Court pointed out that the union's interpretation would authorize any
union restriction on the right to resign. Id. at 3071 n.19. The Court also refuted the
dissent's view that restrictions on resignation would not be permitted if they "furthered
none of the purposes of collective action and self-organization." Id. at 3084 n.5. "This
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that the proviso contemplates only those rules providing for admission
and expulsion.6 9 Second, the union contended that the Act's legislative
history shows that Congress made a conscious decision not to protect
union members' rights to resign.7 0 The union referred to the Senate's
omission of a detailed bill of rights from a House bill that contained a
provision making any restriction on a member's right to resign an un-
fair labor practice."' The Court concluded, however, that Congress
included the "right to resign" in the original House bill as a means of
protecting workers unable to resign because of "closed shop" agree-
ments.72 The Act's elimination of the "closed shop" made an explicit
provision protecting the right to resign unnecessary.73
Finally, the union argued that labor unions should be allowed the
same power to restrict the right to resign other voluntary associations
are permitted under common law.74 The Court found that the union's
reading of Granite State was incorrect.75 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that past opinions, including Granite State, were consistent with
the common law rule,76 it noted that common law doctrines should not
limitation is illusory," the Court noted, for such restrictions will always enhance a
union's collective bargaining power. Id at 3072 n.19.
69. Id. at 3072. The Court read the legislative history to illustrate Congress' intent
to insulate, from the proscriptions of § 8(b)(1)(A), rules addressing admission or expul-
sion. Id. See 93 CONG. REC. 4271 (1947). The Court found confirmation of this fact in
the legislative history of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered subsections of
29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)).
70. 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
71. The interpretive dispute between the majority and the dissent centered on the
House report, which stated that the specific prohibitions of that section were "omitted
.. as unfair labor practices." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46
(1947). The majority interpreted the report as having merely an advisory purpose, in-
forming House members that the detailed prohibitions had been removed from the bill.
105 S. Ct. at 3073. The dissent contended that the only permissible interpretation of
that language is an unequivocal rejection on the merits of those detailed prohibitions,
leaving unions to impose restrictions on resignations. Id. at 3084. The dissent disputed
the majority's finding that omission of the "right to resign" provision represents the
House's concession for having gained proscription of the closed shop. In the dissent's
view, this illustrates the Senate's willingness to prohibit the closed shop but its unwill-
ingness to impose contractual conditions on the relationship between the union and its
members. Id.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 3073. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 3073. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
74. 105 S. Ct. at 3074. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. 105 S. Ct. at 3074-75.
76. Id. at 3075.
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determine the validity of restrictions on the right to resign.77 Despite
common law doctrine, the Court reaffirmed that the NLRB's interpre-
tation of the Act warrants deference from the judiciary.78 The Court
held, accordingly, that the NLRB was justified in concluding that, by
restricting the right to resign, League Law 13 contravened the Act's
policy of voluntary unionism.
7 9
Justice Blackmun's dissent offered a different interpretation of the
Act's legislative history and adopted a rigid contract theory to analyze
the parties' competing rights and obligations.80 Justice Blackmun be-
gan his analysis with the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), 1 classifying
League Law 13 as a legitimate internal union rule aimed at acquiring
and retaining union membership.82 The dissent described two distinct
kinds of union rules which the Court had previously distinguished
under the proviso. The first type included reasonable rules represent-
ing members' voluntarily incurred obligations. The second type in-
cluded rules utilizing the employer's power over the employee's
employment status to coerce the employee." In the dissent's view,
League Law 13 did not fall within the proscribed second category of
rules.8 4 Rather, it represented a valid exercise of the union's power to
govern itself as a voluntary association."
The dissent's second major departure from the majority involved the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 3076.
79. Id. at 3070. Justice White concurred, stating that the relevant sections of the
Act and their legislative history were susceptible to either parties' construction. Defer-
ence to the Board was, therefore, not only appropriate but necessary because the agency
is responsible for administering the Act and its interpretation in the instant case was a
permissible one. Id. at 3076-77.
80. Id. at 3077-85. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 3077.
82. Id. at 3078-79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 3078. In its second category, the dissent recognized those rules
that would be in violation of § 8(b)(2). The dissent failed, however, to include those
rules interfering with an employee's employment status, and thus invalid under the
Scofield test. See supra notes 4346 and accompanying text.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 3078. The dissent determined that League Law 13 did not in any
way affect the employee-employer relationship:
An employee who violates the rule does not risk losing his job, and the union
cannot seek an employers' coercive assistance in collecting any fine that is not im-
posed. The rule neither coerces a worker to become a union member against his





majority's position that League Law 13 contravenes the federal labor
policy of voluntary unionism. Justice Blackmun felt that Congress
shielded members' employment rights from a union's disciplinary rules
when it banned "closed shops.' 8 6 According to the dissent, the exclu-
sive means by which an employee's employment rights are impaired is
union inducement of the employer to use his or her influence to enforce
union rules against employees.8 " Absent this effect, union rules do not
interfere with the policy of voluntary unionism."8
The dissent finally argued that union membership is a freely chosen
membership in a voluntary association. 9 Justice Blackmun placed
great weight on the union's legitimate interest in imposing conditions
of membership, like League Law 13, on its members.90 Blackmun ex-
pressed specific concern over members' interest in the right to strike
and members' reliance on the reciprocal decisions of fellow workers to
honor the strike.9 1 Justice Blackmun maintained that Congress did not
intend that the right to refrain guaranteed under section 7 should be
interpreted to impede the right to strike.92 The dissent emphasized the
union's need to be able to adopt reasonable means to insure that the
organization's collective and voluntary decision to strike would not be
86. Id. at 3080-81. The dissent viewed § 8(a)(3) and the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) as
having two fundamentally different purposes. With the adoption of § 8(a)(3), the only
means by which unions could interfere with an employee's employment rights (em-
ployer assistance in enforcing union rules) was removed. Id. at 3082. Section
8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso assures all membership associations the basic right to establish
their own membership rules. For the dissent, League Law 13 does not implicate
§ 8(a)(3), but instead represents an enforceable commitment. Id. The dissent charac-
terizes the majority's understanding of voluntariness as the freedom from enforceable
commitment which threatens the union's power to act collectively. Id. at 3081.
87. Id. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
88. 105 S. Ct. at 3081.
89. 105 S. Ct. at 3082.
90. Id. Referring to League Law 13's evident objective of sustaining a united front,
the dissent stated:
Such a rule protects individual union members' decisions to place their own and
their families' welfare at risk in reliance on the reciprocal decisions of their fellow
workers, and furthers the union's ability to bargain with the employer on equal
terms, as envisioned by the Act. As such, the rule comports with the broader goals
of federal labor policy, which guarantees workers the right to collective action and,
in particular, the right to strike.
Id.
91. Id. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
92. 105 S. Ct. at 3082. Justice Blackmun relied on § 163 of the Act, which pro-
vides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
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subverted.93 On balance, the dissent viewed the individual's interest in
resigning to return to work as subordinate to the union's interest in
solidarity. Justice Blackmun concluded that solidarity could be
achieved only through the collective membership's reciprocal promise
that membership conditions will be honored. 4
The Court's decision in Pattern Maker's League reaffirms a central
tenet of labor law-that the union-member relationship is a voluntary
one. Congress' abolition of the closed shop conclusively supports the
Court's finding that this fundamental policy of labor law, which the
Court characterized as "voluntary unionism," protects an unqualified
right to resign.95 The Court correctly recognized that Congress' elimi-
nation of compulsory full union membership as a condition of employ-
ment removed the need for an express provision in the Act preserving
the right to choose or reject full membership. 6 Implicit in the Court's
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1982).
The dissent found a certain fundamental fairness in a union rule restricting a mem-
ber's right to resign during a strike. 105 S. Ct. at 3082. The majority, on the other
hand, noted that the NLRB's decision preserved the right to strike. Those who wish to
strike may still do so. What the NLRB and the Court are outlawing are those forms of
"restraint and coercion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go
to work." 105 S. Ct. at 3072. See 93 CONG. REc. 4436 (1947) (remarks of Senator
Taft).
93. 105 S. Ct. at 3079. The dissent referred to the "snowball effect" that results
when an increasing number of members return to work. A typical response to the
"snowball" argument is to point out the disincentives of resigning one's membership.
As one commentator notes:
The decision to resign and abandon a strike is not one which the individual em-
ployee will make lightly. By resigning the individual loses the right to participate
in union meetings at which policies are determined, the right to vote in union elec-
tions for officers of the organization which acts as his exclusive representative, and
the right to run for those offices himself. Moreover, he may lose all the fringe
benefits attached to union membership. Finally, the resignee subjects himself to
the social stigma of having abandoned his fellows in the midst of their battle.
Millan, supra note 15, at 265.
94. 105 S. Ct. at 3082. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
96. The Court's decision avoids the impractical and harsher consequences of giving
the Act's "acquisition and retention of membership" language a literal reading. First,
any rule the union should wish to prescribe could be designed to fit such an interpreta-
tion. Second, for the Court to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with two his-
torical mandates of labor law: (1) Congress' intent that the Act works for the primary
benefit of the individual employees, who collectively make up the union; and (2) the




reasoning is its recognition of the employee's inferior bargaining posi-
tion relative to the union's when the two parties are forming the terms
of their relationship. 9
7
The Court's decision in Pattern Makers' League is consistent with
prior case law. The Court uses the dichotomy of internal and external
enforcement of union rules established in Allis-Chalmers. Reiterating
its belief that the Act recognizes two degrees of union membership, full
members and dues-paying only members, the Court permitted enforce-
ment of reasonable sanctions only against full members. The Act's
guarantee to unions that they may freely govern their "internal" affairs
does not authorize restrictions on the right to resign. In addition, the
policy of voluntary unionism in Pattern Makers' League fortifies the
Scofield test's second prong, thus clarifying the Act's guarantee to em-
ployees that they shall have an absolute right to choose between the
two levels of membership.
Without question, the Court's decision potentially reduces the force
of a union's strike option in terms of bargaining power, particularly
when the union is small and more sensitive to losses in membership.
Although the individual prevailed against the union in Pattern Maker's
League, the union's power to govern its internal affairs as the employ-
ees' exclusive bargaining agent and the right to strike are preserved.
Considering the financial and social disincentives a member faces when
deciding to resign union membership,98 it is premature to conclude
that Pattern Makers' League completely undermines the union's pri-
mary collective-bargaining weapon, the power to strike.
The result in Pattern Makers' League promotes the Act's original
intent to provide a vehicle through which individual employees can
shape their own employment relations. 99 The fact that the decision is
split, however, suggests that there is no clear consensus regarding what
forms of deterrents or incentives unions may adopt to discourage a
member's decision to resign short of interfering with a member's right
to resign. Pattern Makers' League clearly makes it more difficult for
97. See supra notes 26, 51 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. The contract theory is ill-suited for application to the union-member relation-
ship. First, the terms of a union-member relationship are established and amended pur-
suant to a majority rule vote, while a standard contract requires assent by all parties to
the agreement. Second, nowhere does the Act refer to the union-member relationship
as being contractual in nature or that its provisions can be modified or waived through
union-member agreements.
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labor organizations to achieve parity with employers when engaged in
collective bargaining.
Michael M. Tamburini
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